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INTRODUCTION-
Ihe loss of coolant accident resulting from a prinary system rupture has been, and continues to be, a subject for accident analysis in light Water reactor (MR) licensing and is a design basis for emergency systems to maintain core cooling* A : gia4i8j? sceidsnt also providers a basis for design, of the heat transport systems of the liquid aetal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR). The LMFBR system, with a low pressure coolant operating at several hundred degrees Fahrenheit below its boiling point, has a much different response to that accident than a MR, leading to different design solutions• In both systems, the design must include provisions for sensing the malfunction, reducing reactor core power, cooling the core during reduction of power, and removal of decay heat on a relatively long-term basis. Primary system rupture to the primary coolant system. Although the primary coolant loops are interdependent,, in that they connect into common inlet and outlet plenums in the reactor vessel, the characteristics of a sodium system offer the potential for accommodating a primary system rupture without invalidating the unaffected main loops and without an extensive system drain down. The LMFBR primary system is a low pressure system, less than 160 pslg at any point in the system, with the basic source of pressurization being the main circulating pumps. Tripping these pumps permits the system to be rapidly depressurized. As the main pumps are normally tripped subsequent to reactor trip, in order to minimize thermal shock to the components, depressurization occurs as a standard operating procedure.
Since a loss of coolant accident in a sodium In the MR is a depressurization accident in which system is essentially a drain-down or pump-out coolant is expelled through its own expansion, and alternate methods of introducing water to the reactor are required from emergency and auxiliary systems* Primary system rupture in the LMFBR is essentially a liquid leakage accident, and the same systems utilized in power production provide a means for emergency core cooling.
In the following sections, the coolant system of a piped XHFBH, the tfestinghouse LHFBR Demonstration Plant, and the sequence of events following a large primary system pipe rupture are condition, the elevation or containment of the system can be employed, in combination with tripping the main pumps, to limit the Ions of coolant inventory. By restricting the loss of sodium inventory such that the submergence of the reactor vessel main coolant nozzles is maintained, the other unaffected primary loops and associated main heat transport system components remain operable as redundant emergency and long-term decay heatremcroal systems. The flow provided by the coastdown of the pumps, following the reactor and pump described. Methods for analysis of system response trips, cools the core in the period immediately urn sunmtrized, and a sunwary of results of the analysis are presented.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
The Weitinghcuse LMFBR Demonstration Plant is a piped system featuring three main heat transport loops with the accepted arrangement of tandem primary and intermediate ooolint loops transportlnjc the reactor h<»at to a water-stetm system. The Inherent independence of the separate intermediate oooXant loops andi redundant feedwater supplies to the individual a1;ea» generators In eaoh loop limit the conoern regarding t loss of coolant aooident following a system rupture. The pumps coast to approximately 10 percent speed, which is then maintained constant by the pump pony motors. At this pony motor operating condition, the flow in any unaffeoted main loop is adequate to ensure long-term decay heat removal. However, the dove loped head produced by the pony motor operation 1B insufficient to pump further ooolant from the elevated and contained system out of the rupture onoe a minimum ooolant level has been achieved in the reactor vessel.
The For the unaffected main loops to remain operable following & rupture requires that submergence of the reactor vessel main coolant nozzles be maintained, with the submergence of the outlet nozzles being the critical consideration. The elevation or containment of the remainder of the system is, therefore, considered in relationship to the reactor vessel outlet nozzlos. All components and directly attached piping are doubly contained, within guard vossels, to an elevation above the reactor vessel outlet nozzles. This elevation is equal to a guaranteed minimum reactor vessel nozzle subnergence plus the head of about 6 ft of sodium developed by the main pump* when operating at pony motor speed* The primary piping, except for the oonneotlons to the components within the guard vessels, Is Installed above this minimum elevation without additional oontainment.
With a free surface level in the reactor vessel, the volume in the vessel above the outlet nozzles is a reservoir of coolant stored in the system. This reservoir serves to supply the pumps during the coastdown and pump-out period in the event of a pipiug rupture or serves to fill the guard vessels in tho event of a component leak such that the reactor vessel outlet nozzle submergence can be maintained. The requirements of coolant inventory storage and the accommodation of the piping elevations beneath the operating floor require an increase in th* reactor vessel length between the outlet nozzles and the top flange of about 7.5 ft above that necessary to meet other functional requirements for the component* In addition, the « jnp length is sized to assure Impeller submtrg. :ce during pony motor operation with a minimi*, reactor vessel coolant level • There is no free surface in the intermediate heat exchanger, but one does exist In the pump tank. The communication between the reservoir' in the pump tank and the sump is restricted to small leakage, and thus the change in sodium level in the pump tank is so small as to not affect the response of the system during a rupture 1 If a piping rupture occurs on the suotion side of the pumps between the reactor outlet nozzles and the pump inlet, no driving pressure* to drain the system exlot after the cover gas volume In the reactor vessel has expanded to the ambient pressure. The loss of coolant is then caused by a draining of the loop or component to the level of the rupture or to the top of the guard tanks, whichever is higher in elevation. Since there is no pumping of sodium from the system following coastdown to pony motor speeds, system minimum levels and operability of the unaffected main loops are assured irrespective of the size of the rupture. This is particularly significant in this system with a cold leg pump since over 70 percent of the piping is located on the suction side of the pump.
Since the rupture on the suction side leads to less severe consequences than rupture on the discharge side,, the analysis reported will be that of a rupture in the pump discharge piping.
Considering the response of the system to a piping rupture on the discharge side of the pump, between the pump and the reactor vessel inlet, subsequent to reactor scram caused by one of several nnilfunction signals, all main circulating pumps are tripped» When pump out has occurred, pony motor speed has been obtained, and the level in the reactor vessel has fallen to an elevation approximately 6 tt below the elevated piping, the head developed by tha pumps at pony motor speed is insufficient to pump further coolant from the system. Circulation can be maintained in the other, unaffected, main loops, which remain filled with sodium, with the elevated portions of those loops operating at below the ambient pressure in the containment building. The pump pony motors provide the power to overcome ths system hydraulic resistance and.maintain 10 percent flow in the intact loops. Since the loss of coolant is due to pump out during the coastdown period, the inertial and the head-flow characteristics of the pumps, together with the size of the rupture, determine the transient flow through the core and the coolant inventory storage requirements. Similar considerations are applicable to component leaks or rupture occurring at a lower elevation within the component guard vessels.
A further feature of the design requiring consideration in the use of cold leg pumps with a pressurized cover gas volume in the reactor vessel to provide the net positive suction head (NFSH) to the pumps« To prevent expulsion of the coolant by the expansion of tha pressurized cover gas, the gas volume is limited with a controlled makeup and a supply cutoff on low sodium level. The volume and pressure of the cover gas are determined auoh that when the reactor vessel sodium level falls by about one foot, the gas has expanded to essentially ambient pressure. To prevent drawing a vaouura inside the vessel and to provide sufficient KFSH to the pumpn, ensuring an adequate flow for emergency cooling, the oover gas supply is terminated and the region is vented to the inerted compartments of tha containment building at a preset reactor vessel sodium level. The code utilizes the differential equations for conservation of coolant mass and the conservation of momentum. These equations are applied at representative nodes around the intact and ruptured loops, with boundary conditions of known cover gas pressure as a function of time and constant pressure outside the rupture. A typical configuration for a two-or three-loop plant is shown in Fig. 2 . The nodes have been chosen so that critical parameters other than flows such as core outlet pressure, pump inlet pressure, and cover gas pressure may be monitored during the transient. All intact loops are lumped with the assumption that they all will respond identically.
METHOD OP ANALYSIS
The cover gas pressure is determined by the perfect gas law as the coolant level fall in the reactor vessel. Pump acceleration or deceleration is obtained from an equation describing the torque balance on the pump with the option of Incorporating pony motors at a specified speed.. Tyo c-heck valve simulations are available, one for a ball type valve and one for a swinging disk-type valve.
Pump cavitation is detected by nosing when the available NFSH goes below that required for non-cavitatlng flow. Once cavitation occurs, the acceleration of flow through the pump or pumps experiencing cavl'-ation is limited to that which makes the available NFSH equal to the required NFSH. There is a dearth of information concerning the operating characteristics of a oavitating pump, and it is felt that the foregoing approaoh yields reasonable results.
Flow out of tha rupture is modeled by a modified nozzle equation with the disoharge coefficient usually chosen as one. In the case of a double-ended rupture, the flow out of the rupture is given by an equation describing the discharge of fluid out of a pipe.
The foregoing equations are r..?ved using a Pump trip is delayed one sooond after the reaotor trip breakers are opened as a safety feature incorporated into the denign to ensure that. After a plant trip signal has been generated, the flow does not reduce before reaotor trip has; ooourred. This delay is a design parameter that nay be varied to balance core transient cooling requirements and ooolant Inventory requirements.
For a double-ended rupture, for example, the first trip signal is derived from the full power nuolear instrumentation indicating a power level lnorease above the trip »et point of 108 percent nominal power. The-reactor trip breakers areopened O.85 BHC after the rupture which'includes all instrunant and logic delays../ The pumps aril then tripped at I.85 sec after the rupture. Other trip functions include power-to*flow ratio, cover gas pressure, intermediate power nuclear instrumentation, fuel assembly outlet temperature, and vessel level. The trip functions thus obtained define a series of thermal-hydraulic runs for the second phase to deteraine the response of the system to various sized cold-leg ruptures in conJunction with various trip functions. Although the system contains a check valve, the operation of which improves system response, it was not considered in the analysis. Redundant sensors are provided in each of -two fully Independent protective systems, both of which have capability for insuring reactor shutdown with the most reactive control rod stuck. Thus, it would be unreasonable to couple the hypothetical low probability large rupture with the low probability of protection system failure. For more probable fractional cross-sectional area ruptures, the protection system provides additional backup through the slower acting alternate signals.
RESULTS
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Application of the data presented in the foregoing requires Judgment as to the acceptability of consequences to an event when evaluated against the probability or frequency of expected occurrence.
The Instantaneous, double-ended pipe rupture Is a hypothetical event whloh would not be expected to occur over many plant lifetimes. Therefore, It would be reasonable to accept the possibility of local fuel damage as a consequence of thla hypothetical event, if that damage did not lead to extensive fuel damage or initiate a reactivity excursion. The case of a minor pipe rupture, although also of low probability, should not lead to economic damage of the fuel.
The analysis indicates that hot channel coolant temperatures would remain below saturation on ruptures up to 100 percent for the first trip, although some reduction in fuel lifetime capability may result. For smaller ruptures, coolant temperatures do not reach levels which would affect fuel capability. In the extreme hypothetical case, boiling may occur at the outlet of a limited number of hot channels. The formation of voids, however, is at the top of the core in a region with a negative sodium void reactivity coefficient and would not be expected to lead to reactivity insertion or fuel slumping. Further local core dynamic analysis would be required to verify that estimate. However, experimental data, which would permit reduction or conservatism in hot channel factors and adjustment design parameters, such as pump inertia, sequence of reactor and pump trip) and sodium inventory, may obviate the need for such analysis. Other design options available for reduction of peak coolant temperatures response to pipe rupture include reduction of pipe diameter in the pump discharge to vessel run (with increased sodium velocity), use of dual piping to reduoe maximum rupture size, and utilization of check valves as an engineered safeguard to limit flow reversal and sodium loss. Increase in number of loops, of course,, redwes v>3 sever-, ity of the transient. , '
